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With the 50th anniversary of the adoption of the Antarctic Treaty,1 a degree of 
triumphalism has recently been evident around the Antarctic Treaty System 
(ATS).2 A high level celebratory event was held in Washington DC (where the 
original treaty was signed) associated with the calculated hosting of the 2009 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in the United States. The significance 
of the anniversary has been further bolstered, particularly in the eyes of parts 
of the Antarctic science community, by the ending of the fourth International 
Polar Year (IPY) in 2008. The latter has itself engendered not only a massive 
new scientific literature, but a social sciences focus on “legacy” which looks 
both forward from the recent scientific project, and back to the third IPY, 
better known as the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-58.3 The 
social sciences used the legacy framing to finally inveigle a place at the 
Antarctic “science” table, previously denied it by the dominance of physical 
sciences and the absence of the indigenous peoples’ or conventionally 
resident populations’ issues which had long sanctioned Arctic participation. 
Antarctic science’s international coordinating body, the Scientific Committee 
on Antarctic Research (SCAR), even established a new Social Science Action 
Group.4 The historic influence of IGY on the subsequent centrality of science 
in the ATS has encouraged some officials and (particularly) scientists to see 
the fourth IPY as necessarily reinvigorating this regional regime. Science, on 
this view, is re-affirmed as the driving interest in Antarctica. Whether or not 
this proves to be the case, as Jabour and Haward conclude, it “will reinforce 
and perhaps reinvigorate the nexus between science and politics” (emphasis 
added).5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
# Gateway Antarctica Centre for Antarctic Studies and Research; resident Canberra 
1 The Antarctic Treaty. Adopted Washington DC 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 
1961. 402 UNTS 71. 
2 “’Antarctic Treaty System’ means the Antarctic Treaty, the measures in effect under that 
Treaty, its associated separate international instruments in force and the measures in effect 
under those instruments” – Article 1, 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty.  32 ILM 568. 
3 See, for example: Dian Olson Belanger, Deep Freeze: The United States, the International 
Geophysical Year, and the Origins of Antarctica’s Age of Science (Boulder: University Press 
of Colorado, 2006); and Jessica M Shadian and Monica Tennberg, eds., Legacies and Change 
in Polar Sciences: Historical, Legal and Political Reflections on the International Polar Year 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). 
4 Details at http://www.scar.org/researchgroups/via/ 
5 Julia Jabour and Marcus Haward. Antarctic Science, Politics and IPY Legacies”, in Jessica M 
Shadian and Monica Tennberg, eds., Legacies and Change in Polar Sciences: Historical, Legal 
and Political Reflections on the International Polar Year (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 101. 
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This paper seeks to examine one rather significant aspect of the present 
Antarctic dispensation that the celebratory hoopla seems to have entirely 
overlooked. Namely that, whatever just claims may be made for the successes 
of the Antarctic Treaty and the ensuing ATS in the past, this system entered a 
phase of institutional stasis following the adoption of its last major 
component, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
(Madrid Protocol),6 back in 1991. A charitable defence would be that the 
intervening two decades have been necessary to bed-in a number of 
developments set in train then. The Madrid Protocol, the consequences of the 
final agreement in 2001 to establish an Antarctic Treaty Secretariat,7 and the 
adoption in 2005 of a long-negotiated sixth annex to the Madrid Protocol,8 
were not inconsiderable projects. But, allowing this, the main ‘operating 
manual’ for the ATS (comprising its main legal instruments) is now rather 
long in the tooth by international standards. Even the newest major 
instrument of the ATS, the Madrid Protocol, was very largely created by 
sowing together, with limited updating, a series of pre-existing standards and 
practices, some of which essentially dated to the mid 1960s. The formalizing 
of legal obligation provided by the Madrid Protocol is valuable, but 
substantively it reflects best Antarctic practice somewhat earlier than its 
adoption date.  
The world has changed mightily since the adoption of the Madrid 
Protocol in 1991, and Antarctica has in many respects seen the greatest 
expansion (qualitatively and quantitatively) of human activity over this 
period.9 A variety of mandatory Measures (and Conservation Measures under 
CCAMLR) and hortatory Resolutions have indeed been adopted over the past 
two decades, but these have been, of course, properly subsidiary to the rights 
and duties accepted under the main ATS instruments. They are to these what 
domestic Regulations are to Acts, and thus ultimately not substitutes for them.  
The ATS has not really kept pace with the material development of human 
activity in Antarctica over this period.  
In important ways this has led to the ATS being ‘hollowed out’ over 
the past 20 years, so that although the edifice still looks shiny in certain lights, 
the degree to which the Antarctic is actually operationally managed by the ATS 
has declined. Nothing is yet terminal, but the current complacency around 
our Antarctic arrangements — complacency certainly reinforced by 2009’s 50th 
anniversary — warrants some attention. Implicit in this concern is a genuinely 
positive analysis of what the ATS has actually achieved (even if this cannot be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. Adopted Madrid 4 October 
1991, entered into force 14 January 1998. 30 ILM 1455. 
7 Decision 1 (2001). Page 45 in Russia, Final Report of the Twenty-fourth Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002). For an analysis see, 
Patrizia Vigni, “The Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty: Achievements and Weaknesses Three 
Years after its Establishment” in Gillian Triggs and Anna Riddell, eds., Antarctica: Legal and 
Environmental Challenges for the Future (London: British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2007), 17. 
8 Measure 1 (2005): Annex VI to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty: Liability Arising from Environmental Emergencies. Pages 61-72 in Antarctic Treaty 
Secretariat, Final Report of the Twenty-Eighth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (Buenos 
Aires: Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, 2005); and Alan D Hemmings, “Agreement to a Liability 
Annex to the Protocol,” Antarctic 23 (2005): 50. 
9 See: Alan D Hemmings, “From the New Geopolitics of Resources to Nanotechnology: 
Emerging Challenges of Globalism in Antarctica,” The Yearbook of Polar Law 1 (2009): 53. 
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conceded to be everything that is sometimes claimed) and, critically, what it 
might still be able to achieve, if it can be reinvigorated and not left merely 
burnishing its long-service medals. 
It is certainly not unreasonable to celebrate a cooperative half-century 
in the Antarctic, where the barbarities so regularly associated with just about 
everywhere else in the world have been avoided. However, the crude 
validation sometimes sought in these celebrations for some rather simplistic 
Antarctic lessons, behind which significant geopolitical and sectoral interests 
are allowed to remain unexamined, has not been entirely comforting. 
Amongst these are the reinforcement of an Antarctic creation myth wherein 
science plays Ulysses in the foundation of the ATS (and essentially and 
successfully outwits perfidious diplomats and politicians in securing a 
rational humanist Antarctic dispensation based on science), an ascription of 
all positive Antarctic outcomes to the existence of the Antarctic institutions, 
and an overstatement of the degree to which the underlying territorial 
sovereignty issues have actually been dealt with10. A recent editorial by Klaus 
Dodds offers a useful corrective to some of this, noting that: “my own view is 
that we need to be a little more jaundiced. Science was, at its best, a mecha- 
nism for promoting cooperation and exchange”.11  
An obvious consequence of the recent focus on the past 50 years of the 
ATS has been to reinforce a tendency for much of Antarctic social science to 
be essentially historical in focus (Antarctica’s ‘Heroic Age’ continues to exert a 
disproportionate attraction), if not sometimes downright exculpatory in 
relation to national interests.12 Substantially less scholarly attention has been 
directed to current and future ‘problems’, and critical thinking about the 
Antarctic future.13 So, to take just one facet: at a time when some of us are 
concerned about the changing role of Antarctic science and Antarctic 
scientists, and perhaps the erosion of boundaries between objective, 
disinterested science on the one hand and applied research and pecuniary 
interest on the other,14 we see a further embedding of a worldview and 
reflexive claims for the inherent disinterestedness of science that may have 
been excessive even in 1959. But, for all of us who swim in the small Antarctic 
pool, it is salutary to discover that (whatever our view on the detail) even the 
recent spike in Antarctica’s profile has not guaranteed that it enters the 
mainstream popular imagination. Pulitzer Prize winner Fred Kaplan’s 2009 
examination of the allegedly world-altering events of a single year, 1959: The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See e.g.: Paul Berkman. “International spaces promote peace”, Nature 462 (2009): 412; and 
Paul Berkman, ”Common interests in the international space of Antarctica”, Polar Record 46 
(2009): 7.  
11 Klaus Dodds, “Guest editorial – the 1959 Antarctic Treaty: Reflecting on the 50th 
Anniversary of a Landmark Agreement,” Polar Research 29 (2010): 146.  
12 Klaus Dodds and Alan D Hemmings, “Stenographers of Power: Reply to Haward and 
Bergin,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 56 (2010): 617. 
13 For a helpful bridge between the past and present, see: Klaus Dodds, “Governing 
Antarctica: Contemporary Challenges and the Enduring Legacy of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty,” 
Global Policy 1 (2010): 108.  
14 In relation to one cutting edge issue, bioprospecting, see: Alan D Hemmings, “Does 
Bioprospecting Risk Moral Hazard for Science in the Antarctic Treaty System?” Ethics in 
Science and Environmental Politics 10 (2010): 5; and: Sanjay Chaturvedi, “Biological 
Prospecting in the Southern Polar Region: Science-Geopolitics Interface,” in Jessica M Shadian 
and Monica Tennberg, eds., Legacies and Change in Polar Sciences: Historical, Legal and 
Political Reflections on the International Polar Year (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 171. 
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Year Everything Changed, managed to entirely overlook the negotiation and 
adoption of the Antarctic Treaty without any of his reviewers seeming to 
notice or care.15 The reality is that, beyond the hardy perennials of stories 
about Heroic-Era Antarctic expeditions and contrived modern junkets, and 
periodic eruptions of nationalism around whaling or resource futures,16 the 
Antarctic still has a low public profile. This holds even in the relatively more 
aware claimant states of the southern hemisphere. 
The party is now over and we can begin a more critical examination of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the ATS, and start to consider what might be 
necessary if we are to create arrangements in Antarctica for the future. 
Essential to this project is a cold-eyed appraisal of not only the contingencies 
around the achievement of the ATS and its subsequent development, but the 
consequential hollowness of the regime in certain respects. The central 
argument made here is that quite aside from a certain inherent hollowness of 
the ATS, arising from the peculiar legal circumstances of Antarctica, a more 
recent and substantial hollowing has arisen as a result of the challenges of 
globalism. There is nothing irreversible about either. The former presents a 
more substantial challenge, for reasons that will be explained; the challenges 
posed by globalism are both more tractable and resolvable over a shorter time 
span. The question is largely one of political will. 
 
Achieving the Antarctic Treaty System 
 
The politico-legal regime provided by the ATS evolved to deal with a place 
apart, both spatially and geopolitically. Antarctica was effectively isolated, 
legally as well as physically, from the rest of the planet. Very little activity 
occurred within the area and what did was restricted in scope, largely 
discontinuous, and conducted by governments. Overwhelmingly this activity 
consisted of scientific research or the provision of its associated infrastructure 
and logistics support, notwithstanding deeper strategic drivers emanating in 
nationalism and global ideological competition. Until the mid-1970s there was 
also negligible human activity in the oceanic band immediately surrounding 
Antarctica, further insulating it.17 The geopolitical focus for action was 
relations between states, and the rationale for collective international 
management of the region was to overcome that most corrosive and 
dangerous friction point of inter-state relations: disputation over territory.  
The key unresolved issue in Antarctica was (and remains) territorial 
sovereignty: seven claimants,18 three of whom claim essentially the same 
area,19 two superpowers who dispute all seven claims but reserve a basis to 
claim themselves,20 with cross recognition of claims confined to five of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Fred Kaplan, 1959: The Year Everything Changed (Hoboken NJ: John Wiley, 2009). 
16 See e.g.: Klaus Dodds and Alan D Hemmings, “Frontier Vigilantism? Australia and 
Contemporary Representations of Australian Antarctic Territory,” Australian Journal of 
Politics and History 55 (2009): 513.  
17 On the historical phases of Antarctic development see: Alan D Hemmings, “Globalisation’s 
Cold Genius and the Ending of Antarctic Isolation” in Looking South: Australia’s Antarctic 
Agenda, ed. Lorne K Kriwoken, Julia Jabour and Alan D Hemmings (Leichardt: The 
Federation Press, 2007), 176. 
18 Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, United Kingdom. 
19 Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom. 
20 United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia). 
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claimants,21 and no explicit recognition of claims by any other existing state. 
From the late 1940s, the consequential “Antarctic Problem” was seen in both 
pan-Antarctic and Antarctic regional contexts. E.W. Hunter Christie’s 
celebrated 1951 volume focused on the increasingly intense three-way dispute 
around territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic Peninsula,22 which 
subsequently led the United Kingdom to seek a resolution through the 
International Court of Justice.23 Soviet and American international lawyers 
were mindful of the Peninsula, but focused on the wider Antarctic problem.24 
Further, with no indigenous or permanent residents, in the particular 
circumstances of Antarctica in the post-War world, states were not only 
formally responsible for any international obligations entered into there as 
states, but they were by far the most likely direct operators of any Antarctic 
activity. There were very few private expeditions, and whaling activities were 
conducted under an entirely separate non-ATS instrument, through the 
International Whaling Commission.25  
As we know, an international mechanism to address the Antarctic 
Problem was found in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. Difficult as the issues were, 
they were eased to some considerable degree by two realities: that the 
settlement involved a comparatively small number of states,26 and that the 
technical capacity of even these states and the circumstances of the global 
economy meant that there was no immediate likelihood of substantial human 
activity apart from scientific research being considered in the extremely 
difficult Antarctic environment. However, the possibility of commercially 
viable raw materials “over the long run” was already anticipated.27  
The achievement of the Antarctic Treaty created a balm for the 
immediate problems posed by territorial sovereignty. Article IV did not of 
course finally resolve the issue,28 but it created the space for the development 
of the inter-state system that became the ATS. With open territorial 
disputation at least set to one side, the Antarctic Treaty could bumble along 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Australia, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom. The claims of 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have of course a common Imperial British 
root. 
22 E W Hunter Christie, The Antarctic Problem (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1951). 
23 International Court of Justice Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Antarctica Cases 
(United Kingdom v Argentina; United Kingdom v Chile) Orders of March 16th 1956: 
Removal From the List (The Hague: International Court of Justice, 1956). 
24 P A Toma, “Soviet Attitudes Towards the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty in the 
Antarctic,” The American Journal of International Law 50(3) (1956): 611; and R D Hayton, 
“Polar Problems and International Law,” The American Journal of International Law 52(4) 
(1958): 746. 
25 See: Alan D Hemmings, ”Environmental Law – Antarctica” in The Encyclopedia of 
Sustainability, Volume 3: The Law and Politics of Sustainability, ed. K Bosselmann, D Fogel 
and J B Ruhl, (Great Barrington MA: Berkshire, 2010), 188.  
26 The 12 states which had participated in the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year in 
Antarctica: The seven claimants: Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway 
and the United Kingdom; the United States and the Soviet Union which both argued a basis 
to claim; and Belgium, Japan and South Africa. 
27 R D Hayton, “The Antarctic Settlement of 1959,” The American Journal of International 
Law 54(2) (1960): 348. 
28 For some considerations on territorial sovereignty see: Alan D Hemmings, “Beyond 
Claims: Towards a Non-Territorial Antarctic Security Prism for Australia and New Zealand,” 
New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 6 (2009): 77. 
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quite nicely, with relatively little activity and at low cost for the next several 
decades. Whilst the number of parties to the Antarctic Treaty thereafter began 
to increase slightly, in its first decade and a half what was actually being 
governed in Antarctica was small-scale scientific activity at and around the 
few dozen generally small scientific facilities of just the 12 original Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Parties.29 And, there were no significant intrusions into 
the Antarctic of activities or norms generated outside the Antarctic 
community.30 The effective isolation of the Antarctic in both a geophysical and 
a geopolitical sense allowed the emergence of a regionally-orientated 
Antarctic exceptionalism as the implicit ideological basis for the ATS.31 
One seemingly substantive indicator of the real activity levels in the 
early Antarctic political regime is the fact that until the adoption of the 
Madrid Protocol in 1991, strategic Antarctic management was largely 
achieved through biennial Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings.32 However, 
from its inception in 1980 the Commission established under the Convention 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)33 met 
annually, and in the course of elaborating the Convention for the Regulation 
of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)34 during the 1980s, 
special meetings were held at a rate of several a year over a number of years. 
Resource issues, plainly, triggered a much more intense work schedule. But, 
the two-year gaps between ATCMs, and the fact that at this time there was no 
professional secretariat, says something about the generally low level, and 
uncomplicated nature, of traditional non-resource focused Antarctic activity. 
To an extent, the ATS has always been a hollow35 system in that the 
peculiarities of the Antarctic meant that the formal edifice of the international 
institution addressing it would necessarily be a structure both lightly built 
and somewhat isolated. The dance around territorial sovereignty made this 
almost inevitable. Absent a resident population, and with (to this day) its 
highest forum an annual meeting of officials, with no systemic political forum 
in which Ministers would address the hard issues (and in particular, as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The close point for this early period is taken here as the VIII ATCM in Oslo in 1975. 
30 Note that even the Antarctic Treaty Article V(2) provision that the rules agreed under any 
future international agreement concerning use of nuclear energy, nuclear explosions and 
disposal of radioactive waste material – perhaps the clearest coupling of the Antarctic 
regional arrangement with possible global arrangements – had not (and has not since) been 
realized.  
31 On Antarctic exceptionalism, and challenges to, see: Alan D Hemmings, “Globalisation’s 
Cold Genius and the Ending of Antarctic Isolation” in Looking South: Australia’s Antarctic 
Agenda, ed. Lorne K Kriwoken, Julia Jabour and Alan D Hemmings (Leichardt: The 
Federation Press, 2007), 176; and Alan D Hemmings, “From the New Geopolitics of Resources 
to Nanotechnology: Emerging Challenges of Globalism in Antarctica”, The Yearbook of Polar 
Law 1 (2009): 53. 
32 For the decision to move to annual meetings see paragraphs 134-136 in Federal Republic of 
Germany. Final Report of the Sixteenth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Bonn, 7-18 
October 1991. An ATCM was held in 1992, but then not again until 1994. 
33 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. Adopted Canberra 
20 May 1980, entered into force 7 April 1982.  
34 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities. Adopted 
Wellington 2 June 1988, not in force.  
35 The concept of ‘hollowing’ has had widespread use in the context of internal state 
administrative reforms. See for example: R A W Rhodes, “The Hollowing Out of the State: 
The Changing Nature of the Public Service in Britain,” The Political Quarterly 65 (1994): 138. 
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ATS evolved, resolve issues that crossed the separate ATS instruments), the 
political profile of Antarctic discourse was bound to be limited. There have 
been two attempts to engage Ministers in Antarctic meetings, the first a 
meeting in Antarctica organized by New Zealand in January 1999, the second 
a special session in Washington DC associated with the 50th anniversary 
ATCM in 2009.36 In both cases, Ministerial attendance was patchy and 
generally low level, so one should have no illusions that establishing regular 
Ministerial engagement would be easy. Further, the original structure did not 
cover the entire field in Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty left high seas 
freedoms in the region intact, and whaling was already subject to regulation 
by a global instrument.  In relation to whaling, the ATS has adopted a practice 
of complete subsidiarity to the International Whaling Commission (IWC),37 
beyond that necessarily required under the letter of the various ATS 
instruments.38 As a result, the present Australian case against Japan in the 
International Court of Justice makes no reference to the ATS or any 
obligations under its instruments.39 This historic isolation has posed some 
interesting issues around how the protection of the Antarctic environment 
central to the purposes of both CCAMLR and the Madrid Protocol, and the 
particular responsibilities of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) in 
relation to this protection, can be achieved in practice, if institutional 
responsibility is fractionated.40  
Resolving the deep structural hollowness of the ATS would require, in 
my view, a fundamental reassessment of the core of the ‘Antarctic Problem’, 
the question of territorial sovereignty.41 This is no slight project, and even if 
claimants are prepared to entertain it all, its realization will likely take 
considerable time. In short, addressing the original structural hollowness of 
the ATS will not be achieved any time soon.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See: Antarctica New Zealand, Ministerial on Ice: An Historic Meeting (Christchurch: 
Antarctica New Zealand, 1999) and “Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting XXXII 
Washington Ministerial Declaration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty,” in 
Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, Final Report of the Thirty-second Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting (Buenos Aires: Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 2009), 161-162. 
37 See: Alan D Hemmings, Karen R Scott and Michelle Rogan-Finnemore, “Broadening the 
Duty in Relation to Environmental Impact Assessment across the Legal Instruments 
Applying in Antarctica” (paper presented at the 15th Annual Conference of the  Australian 
and New Zealand Society of International Law, Restoring the Rule of Law in International 
Affairs, Canberra, 28-30 June 2007). 
http://www.worldlii.org/int/journals/IHLRes/2007/11.html#fn1 
38 See discussion in: Donald R Rothwell, (Chair), Tim Stephens (Rapporteur), Alan D 
Hemmings, Stuart Kaye, Joanna Mossop and Gillian Triggs, Japan’s ‘Scientific’ Whaling 
Program and the Antarctic Treaty System – Independent Panel of Legal and Policy Experts: 




39 Australia, Application Instituting Proceedings. (The Hague: International Court of Justice, 
31 May 2010). http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/15951.pdf 
40 Noting that, e.g. the Madrid Protocol at Article 2 (Objective and Designation) commits 
Parties to “the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems”. 
41 This issue is the subject of a separate research project. A preliminary discussion can be 
fond in Alan D Hemmings, “Beyond Claims: Towards a Non-Territorial Antarctic Security 
Prism for Australia and New Zealand”, New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 6 (2009): 
77. 
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The Broadening of Antarctic participation  
 
With the appearance (re-appearance in the case of sealing) of specific resource 
interests from the 1970s, and consequential adoption of new legal 
instruments, ATS participation broadened beyond the narrowly 
governmental pattern of the early years and 12 original signatories. Today the 
ATS involves 54 states42 (for the Antarctic Treaty: 28 ATCPs; 20 Contracting 
Parties; plus Malaysia, which has a de facto membership as a seemingly 
permanent invitee to ATCMs; for CCAMLR 34 states: 25 Commission 
Members and 14 Contracting Parties).43 Commercial interests brought non-
state actors into the Antarctic in the form of marine harvesters, tourists, and 
tourism operators (and at one stage, potentially sealers and miners), hoping to 
realize resource benefits or (later with the appearance of environmental 
NGOs such as Greenpeace) to argue for non-material values and specifically 
against particular resource exploitation futures. Three strictly non-
governmental organizations: the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition 
(ASOC), the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) 
and the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) joined two other 
long-standing observer organizations (the Scientific Committee for Antarctic 
Research (SCAR) and the World Conservation Union (IUCN)) in the ATS 
fora.44 
Whilst subsequent attention to managing resource issues around 
sealing, fishing, and mining, and a new focus on the environment, reflected 
the presence of non-state actors in Antarctica, and allowed a limited formal 
participation, in practice the changes to the system were limited. The ATS 
continued to be predicated on the appropriateness of regional arrangements 
and the continuing validity of Antarctic exceptionalism in managing small-
scale and discontinuous human activity. Critically, the consensus decision-
making that remains at the core of the ATS and the modus vivendi over 
territorial sovereignty positions, remained the prerogative of ATCPs and 
CCAMLR Commission Members. Contracting Parties, let alone Observers 
and Experts, have no substantive role in decision-making anywhere in the 
ATS. These new participants—whether operationally active in Antarctica or 
successful in achieving a formal standing within the institutions of the ATS—
might acquire influence or even periodic power, but this was achieved, and 
reflected, through informal routes (effective lobbying of particular national 
delegations or governments at home, public opinion, contributions via 
technical fora, and so on). 
Even within the Madrid Protocol, the most recently added instrument, 
the modus operandi are still very largely predicated on a norm of Antarctic 
activity as something conducted by governments, notwithstanding the now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 In CCAMLR this includes what is still termed there the European Community. 
43 Sources: For the Antarctic Treaty and Madrid Protocol – United States, “Report of the 
Depository Government of the Antarctic Treaty and its Protocol in accordance with 
Recommendation XIII-2,” Information Paper 102 tabled at XXXIII Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting, Punta del Este, Uruguay, 3-14 May 2010. For CCAMLR – see the Treaty 
Status List maintained by Australia as the Depository State at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaty_list/depository/CCAMLR.html  
44 A number of other intergovernmental organizations, such as the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) are also invited experts. 
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formally wider catchment. One sees the consequences of this most obviously 
in the context of Antarctic Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), where 
some sorts of tourism activities are difficult to accommodate within a 
framework evolved essentially around fixed-point national programme 
activities.45 Whereas much national programme activity is centred on long-
occupied stations and particular long-term research sites about which a great 
deal of environmental knowledge has been acquired, tourism generally 
involves transient, short-term visitation to many sites. In the latter instance 
there is less likelihood that the environment will be well understood, and 
negligible capacity to actually monitor effects. There are also greater 
uncertainties in relation to where non-governmental activities are actually 
organized (possibly wherever the expedition leader happens to be when they 
turn their laptop on). So that, unlike (say) Antarctica New Zealand or other 
national Antarctic programmes, it is often unclear which state is formally 
responsible for the legal reporting obligations around advance notice and 
EIA. 
This may not in fact cast the ATS as significantly different in practice 
from some other multilateral systems, although there sometimes seems an 
inclination within the ATS itself, to see itself as a particularly progressive and 
open system. Without consideration of other systems, these are necessarily 
speculative reflections, albeit based on direct participation in some 37 ATS 
meetings between 1989 and 2009. What seems clearer is that the ATS operates 
in a thinner public-policy field than many other areas of international affairs. 
Absent the clear domestic constituency provided by the existence of residents 
within an area under consideration and the slight chance that any particular 
citizen will have been to Antarctica, with public policy rarely involving overt 
participation by political leaders, with the complexities and sensitivities of 
territorial sovereignty amongst claimants often eliciting little more than knee-
jerk nationalism in the public discourse, general understanding of Antarctic 
governance is extremely weak. This risks leaving the limited and thin 
international governance regime provided by the ATS with very little by way 
of external support. To get a sense of this, imagine for a moment the contexts 
in which any other problematical international issues exist, say the Palestinian 
Question, climate change, or genetically modified organisms. It is surely 
indisputable that these issues, whatever one’s particular stance on them may 
be, exist in a vastly ‘thicker’ setting than any likely Antarctic issue.46  
Institutionally, the ATS developed through the decadal accretion of 
new instruments specifically addressing each new issue (essentially resource 
issues) as they arose: sealing through the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Seals (CCAS) in 1972,47 fishing through CCAMLR in 1980, mining 
through CRAMRA in 1988, and generic environmental protection as well as 
the closing of the mining option, once CRAMRA was abandoned, by the 
Madrid Protocol in 1991. The approach of the ATS was to assume an exclusive 
responsibility for each emergent issue in the area south of 60 degrees South, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Alan D Hemmings and Ricardo Roura, “A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Fitting Impact 
Assessment under the Antarctic Environmental Protocol to Antarctic Tourism,” Impact 
Assessment and Project Appraisal 21(1) (2003): 13. 
46 It is arguable that in the late 1980s, the question of Antarctic minerals activity attracted, for 
a short while, a “thick” setting. 
47 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. Adopted London 1 June 1972, entered 
into force 11 March 1978.  
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or south of the Antarctic Convergence in the case of marine harvesting. With 
the exception of the Antarctic manifestation of global whaling, which was 
already subject to its own separate International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) before the Antarctic Treaty was adopted,48 the 
ATS sought to own and regulate any substantive in-area activities. 
 
The end of Antarctic exceptionalism  
 
A conjunction of events including the ending of the Cold War, the rise of 
globalism and transformation of some states into quasi-market states,49 the 
dramatic expansion of human activities not just in Antarctica but surrounding 
it, and the growth in the number of global instruments that also apply in 
Antarctica, has now undermined this modus operandum.50 Emergent issues are 
now (apparently) construed by ATCPs as either inherently less problematical 
(and thus do not require new dedicated regulation), or merely a regional 
manifestation of a global activity (and thus best left to either global 
regulation, or the informality of market forces). The pattern of past ATS 
development may also have a bearing. Because each successive additional 
instrument in the ATS was without prejudice to pre-existing instruments, the 
ATS has internal inconsistencies and rather more complexity than is really 
justified. The difficulties increase with the number of instruments, and this 
may now also be a disincentive to further ATS development. But the 
substantive change is in the global context, where the historic Antarctic 
regional approach is now orphaned. The ATS as a body has yet to formally 
determine whether it is content to allow this to continue, or whether (and if 
so, how) it might establish a new basis for the regional management of 
Antarctica. 
But in the meantime, the ATS has adopted no new substantive 
instrument since the Madrid Protocol in 1991, and the two industries which 
have largely developed in the period since—tourism and bioprospecting, over 
20 and 10 years respectively—have not yet been subject to the sort of specific 
treaty regulation seen with earlier Antarctic commercial activities. They are 
subject to the generic obligations of the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid 
Protocol (and some forms of bioprospecting in the marine environment may 
be subject to CCAMLR; for other types it is not clear). The specific obligations 
amount to only two hortatory Resolutions in the case of bioprospecting and a 
small number of legally binding Measures applying to tourism and non-
governmental activities,51 (and nothing under CCAMLR). This situation is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.  Adopted in Washington DC 2 
December 1946, entered into force 10 November 1948.  
49 “Market State” sensu Philip Bobbitt. See:  Philip Bobbitt. The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace 
and the Course of History (London: Allen Lane, 2002) – see particularly Chapter 10 “The 
Market State”, 213-242. 
50 Alan D Hemmings, “Globalisation’s Cold Genius and the Ending of Antarctic Isolation” in 
Looking South: Australia’s Antarctic Agenda, ed. Lorne K Kriwoken, Julia Jabour and Alan D 
Hemmings (Leichardt: The Federation Press, 2007), 176; and Alan D Hemmings, “From the 
New Geopolitics of Resources to Nanotechnology: Emerging Challenges of Globalism in 
Antarctica,” The Yearbook of Polar Law 1 (2009): 55. 
51 Whereas ATS responsibility for tourism seems to clearly reside with Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties, exercising rights and duties under the Antarctic Treaty and Madrid 
Protocol, in the case of bioprospecting there is a dual responsibility under not only these 
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long way from the regulatory model provided by CCAS, CCAMLR and 
(putatively) CRAMRA – or even, for all its obvious difficulties, ICRW.  
Whatever the arguments for or against equivalent instruments for 
these later commercial activities, the fact that we do not presently see this 
means that a very large part of current Antarctic activity (particularly in 
relation to tourism) is not substantively regulated by the ATS. There are some 
informal mechanisms, but most of these devolve to relationships between the 
tourism industry and particular states. These include: access arrangements 
concerning visits to research stations, the location of tourism interpretation 
facilities at stations, reciprocal logistics arrangements, medivac agreements, 
and access to historic huts for which particular stations hold the key. In the 
case of bioprospecting, the fact that most of this activity still occurs as an 
integral part of national Antarctic science programmes also allows a degree of 
informal control. Contractually- based legal mechanisms at the national level 
may also have some role in relation to bioprospecting in some jurisdictions. 
But again, this is not a systematic ATS regulation. 
This situation, which has essentially arisen since the adoption of the 
Madrid Protocol, represents a new departure point in ATS practice. Up to this 
point, relatively soon after an incipient industry appeared on the horizon, the 
ATS would always start to negotiate a responsive regime. The ATS reinforced 
its sense of “the special responsibility of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Parties to ensure that all activities in Antarctica are consistent with the 
purposes and principles of the Antarctic Treaty”,52 by creating specific 
regulatory structures through new legal instruments. These structures, whilst 
formally legally autonomous (and thus able to attract particular and differing 
state memberships appropriate to the activity) were coupled to the preceding 
ATS instruments. In particular, through the coupling to the Antarctic Treaty, 
both directly and via the duplicated articles in subsequent instruments, ATS- 
regulated activities have been deliberately tied into the particular and careful 
geopolitical framework established in 1959. That framework was part and 
parcel of the broader Cold War and still active colonial geopolitics, now 
overtaken by history without any substantive readjustments having yet been 
made within the ATS. At the heart of the framework is the artfully crafted 
containment of territorial sovereignty in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, the 
issue that has still not been resolved, and which came again to the fore in 
relation to the extended continental shelf issue. 
Coastal states are entitled under Article 76 of the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)53 to certain rights over the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles if they can demonstrate its extent through data 
submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). 
The seven territorial claimants in Antarctica see themselves as coastal states 
sensu UNCLOS, and have variously sought to reserve their rights as such in 
relation to the continental shelf appurtenant to their Antarctic claims. The 
details of the particular decisions taken by claimant states in relation to the 
extended continental shelf (ECS) in the Antarctic Treaty area need not concern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
instruments but, for the Antarctic marine environment under CCAMLR – and no material 
consideration of bioprospecting has occurred under that instrument. 
52 From Third Recital, Preamble, Madrid Protocol. 
53 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Adopted in Montego Bay, Jamaica 10 
December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994. 
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us here.54 The issue here is that over the past decade,55 although the 
continental shelf has been a major Antarctic geopolitical issue, raising legal 
questions relating to territorial positions,56 and stimulating non-claimant 
ATCPs to lodge notes with the CLCS reiterating non-recognition of territorial 
claims and the provisions of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty,57 absolutely no 
consideration of it has occurred in the fora of the ATS.58 One may search in 
vain for any reference to the issue in the Final Reports of any ATCM. To an 
objective observer, surely, the absence of formal consideration of such a 
significant issue in the very system established to manage Antarctic interests 
is very strange. 
Nonetheless, there were discussions on the margins of the ATS. The 
claimant states, and particularly the subset that recognize each other’s claims 
(Australia, France, Norway, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) 
caucused so as to arrive at as common a position as possible in relation to 
how they argued the benign nature of their interests to other ATCPs. There 
were discussions across a wider group of ATCPs, particularly involving the 
United States, on the margins of the Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on 
tourism in Norway in 2004, and at the United Nations in New York in the 
same year around informal discussions on the Antarctic liability 
negotiations.59 The first CLCS submission by an Antarctic claimant (Australia) 
occurred in November 2004.  
 
Capacity to respond to developments 
 
The Madrid Protocol was developed as a framework convention, with 
technical standards specified in a set of annexes, which could be updated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For details and sources in relation to ECS in the Antarctic see: Alan D Hemmings and Tim 
Stephens, “Australia’s Extended Continental Shelf: What Implications for Antarctica?” Public 
Law Review 20(1) (2009): 9; Alan D Hemmings and Tim Stephens, “Reconciling Regional and 
Global Dispensations: The Implications of Subantarctic Extended Continental Shelf 
Penetration of the Antarctic Treaty Area,” New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 6 
(2009): 273; and Alan D Hemmings and Tim Stephens, “The Extended Continental Shelves of 
sub-Antarctic Islands: Implications for Antarctic Governance,” Polar Record (2010). 
55 The period may reasonably be said to begin in 1999 with an Australian Media Release: 
Robert Hill, Minister for the Environment and Heritage and Alexander Downer, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. “Move to Claim Extended Antarctic Continental Shelf” - Joint Media Release, 
2 December 1999. http://203.6.168.72/releases/1999/fa132b_99.html  
56 For a consideration of the issues see: Stuart B Kaye, “The Outer Continental Shelf in the 
Antarctic,” in A G Oude Elferink  and Donald R Rothwell, eds., The Law of the Sea and Polar 
Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001), 125. 
57 See Hemmings and Stephens (2009) and (2010) above. 
58 Personal observation of the author. See also the statement by senior Swedish diplomat 
Marie Jacobsson that although the claimants, Russia and the US had held consultations, “no 
formal or informal consultations with the rest of the Parties were held” page 6 in Marie 
Jacobsson, “The Antarctic Treaty System: Legal and Environmental Issues – Future 
Challenges for the Antarctic Treaty System” in Gillian Triggs and Anna Riddell, eds., 
Antarctica: Legal and Environmental Challenges for the Future (London: British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 2007), 1. 
59 Alan D Hemmings, “Claimant Stances on Outer Continental Shelf in the Antarctic Treaty 
Area and the Consequences for Antarctic Collective Governance”, Paper presented at New 
Resource Frontiers? Arctic and Antarctic Continental Shelves, The British Library, London, 21 
September 2010. Preliminary summary at 
http://polargeopolitics.wordpress.com/seminars/seminar-2-outcomes-and-statements. 
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periodically as required. The ATCM accepted the advice of its Committee for 
Environmental Protection (CEP) in 2001 that Annex II (Conservation of 
Antarctic Fauna and Flora) would be the first annex to undergo updating.60 
Various aspects of the Annex were seen as overtaken by scientific knowledge 
or environmental best practice. However, an imbroglio developed around 
whether some proposed amendments amounted to more than a technical 
updating and in fact constituted a more fundamental attempt to relitigate 
principles of the Madrid Protocol. The argument that it risked becoming the 
latter was made particularly by the United States, which was supported by a 
small number of marine harvesting states (including Japan, South Korea and 
to an extent China and Russia) who were anxious to prevent any expansion of 
coverage to marine species, or the creation of potential precedents for this 
later). The end result of this was that a quite modestly amended Annex was 
only adopted in 2009.61 This amendment makes no reference to genetically 
modified organisms or other novel materials. It does not (of course) affect the 
management of fish or cetaceans. It adds a qualified duty to include the 
Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels as a source of 
advice, but otherwise seems a very slight advance on the original annex, 
whose own roots were back in the 1964 Agreed Measures for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora. The amendment of just the first 
technical annex (selected because it was judged to be the simplest annex to 
amend) took eight years, compared to the year it took to negotiate and adopt 
the Madrid Protocol itself. It seems slim pickings for such an extended 
process. Such has been the disappointment with this process within the CEP 
that nobody appears enthusiastic about commencing amendment of any other 
annex (there are five in force and a sixth adopted in 2005 which is not yet in 
force). Annex III on Waste Disposal and Waste Management probably needs 
updating, but one cannot be sanguine about the willingness to consider such 
contemporary issues here as new organic pollutants and nanomaterials. 
One might ask why the two most recent Antarctic resource activities 
have not been addressed in a “Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic 
Tourism” and a “Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Biological 
Prospecting” respectively. This would be consistent with earlier ATS practice 
in relation to emergent Antarctic industries (sealing, marine harvesting and 
mineral resources). The short answer based on the ATS track record would, 
presumably, be that they are not deemed to require any regulation, or that 
they are already sufficiently regulated through generic ATS mechanisms, 
perhaps most particularly the Madrid Protocol. These are not answers that 
appear terribly compelling to me.  
It would be rash to suggest that ATCPs intend that tourism and 
bioprospecting be cut loose from the geopolitical imperatives at the heart of 
the ATS. But, the consequence of the fact that they are not subject to 
traditional ATS institutional regulation is still a relative weakening of those 
imperatives. And, whilst again this may not be intended, the fact that nominal 
‘regulation’ of tourism and bioprospecting is thereby left to instruments not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See paragraph 40 in Russia, Final Report of the Twenty-fourth Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002). 
61 Measure 16 (2009) Amendment of Annex II to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to 
the Antarctic Treaty: Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora in Secretariat of the Antarctic 
Treaty, Final Report of the Thirty-Second Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (Buenos 
Aires: Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 2009). 
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designed to do so is not without effect on them. The danger is that in 
requiring them to address the new activities, their functionality in relation to 
activities that they were crafted to address is compromised. Although a proper 
consideration of this lies outside the present paper, there may be a risk that 
one consequence of relying on the Madrid Protocol to manage tourism 
and/or bioprospecting may be to subtly move this instrument’s norms 
towards the sort of ‘rational use’ interpretation of ‘conservation’ established 
under CCAMLR.62 
Over the last decade, a very substantial part of each ATCM has been 
given over to discussing tourism and its implications. As well as this, three 
dedicated Meetings of Experts have also been convened. The level of tourism 
activity has shown a steep upward climb (albeit currently affected, like much 
else, by the Global Financial Crisis),63 and we have seen a steady stream of 
serious maritime incidents in Antarctic waters.64 Despite all the talk, there is 
still no new mechanism to resolve these issues. On the face of it, these 
circumstances indicate at least a comparable need for action to any of the 
other developments that led in the past to new ATS instruments. The 
difficulty surely lies elsewhere. In my judgement, it is a consequence of a 
globalism that now undercuts Antarctic exceptionalism – the traditional ATS 
framing that saw each Antarctic issue as necessarily requiring a specifically 
Antarctic resolution within the framework of the ATS.65  
Whilst tourism and bioprospecting have at least been discussed within 
the ATS, with some low-key responses agreed in restricted areas, some other 
issues appear to have been so sensitive that to date there has been no 
willingness to even do this. These include the question of the extended 
continental shelf considered above and jurisdiction over individuals.  
The text of the Antarctic Treaty is, inter alia, interesting in its specific 
identification of the location (Canberra) of its first meeting following entry 
into force of the instrument.66 It does this in Article IX(1), which itemizes some 
“measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty” which 
the Representatives of Parties may wish to consider at the Canberra, or 
subsequent meetings (the meetings that we refer to as Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings). Amongst these are “(e) questions relating to the 
exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica”. Whereas the other measures itemized 
have, to varying extents, indeed provided the basis for subsequent ATCM 
discussion and specific outcomes, the question of jurisdiction was left alone, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 CCAMLR Article II(2) “For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘conservation’ 
includes rational use.” 
63 Kees Bastmeijer and Ricardo Roura, “Regulating Antarctic Tourism and the Precautionary 
Principle,” The American Journal of International Law 98(4) (2004): 763. 
64 Itemized in: New Zealand, “Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on the Management of 
Ship-borne Tourism in the Antarctic Treaty Area: An Overview”, Working Paper 1 tabled at 
the Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts, Wellington, New Zealand, 9-11 December 2009. 
65 Alan D Hemmings, “Globalisation’s Cold Genius and the Ending of Antarctic Isolation” in 
Looking South: Australia’s Antarctic Agenda, ed. Lorne K Kriwoken, Julia Jabour and Alan D 
Hemmings (Leichardt: The Federation Press, 2007), 176; and Alan D Hemmings, “From the 
New Geopolitics of Resources to Nanotechnology: Emerging Challenges of Globalism in 
Antarctica”, The Yearbook of Polar Law 1 (2009): 53. 
66 I acknowledge Donald R Rothwell for drawing attention to this fact, which as he noted 
seems not to have previously attracted particular attention, at a 2009 workshop in which we 
were both participants. 
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until 1992, when Uruguay tabled a paper under the title: “Issues relating to 
the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica”.67  
This paper was stimulated by a January 1992 incident involving a 
member of Uruguayan station in which a Russian was killed at a nearby 
Russian station on King George Island.68 To summarize the juridical 
complexities around this incident (which the Uruguayan paper itself did not 
state, possibly on the grounds that these were clear enough to at least some of 
their fellow ATCPs): here we had a citizen from a non-claimant ATCP 
(Uruguay) involved in the death of a citizen of a state (Russia) which rejects 
territorial claims but asserts that it has a basis to claims itself, at a Russian 
station, in a part of the Antarctic subject to mutually exclusive territorial 
claims by three states (Argentina, Chile, United Kingdom). This obviously 
presents an interesting juridical situation where we have unresolved 
territorial sovereignty. 
Although an agenda item was established for the ATCM: “Item 18. 
Question Related to the Exercise of Jurisdiction in Antarctica”, there was no 
substantive discussion of this paper on the floor of the meeting, and the 
ATCM Final Report carried a single short paragraph: 
“(131) One Delegation submitted a Working Paper on item 18 (XVII 
ATCM/WP 17). The Meeting agreed that this question should be 
considered at the next Consultative Meeting”.69  
The next ATCM was held in 1994. The agenda item was again duly included 
and Uruguay again tabled a paper (seemingly identical to its 1992 paper 
down to typographical errors in the English version).70 In the space of two 
days, two revisions of this paper were issued, excising reference to the death 
incident and softening the analysis.71 The Final Report reflected the brief 
discussion as follows: 
“(122) A working paper (XVIII ATCM/WP 32) on this item was tabled 
and introduced by Uruguay. 
The Meeting recognized the importance of this question, the solution of 
which was left deliberately open in Article IX (1) of the Antarctic 
Treaty. But it was also understood that the question raises some 
delicate and sensitive problems which need more, and careful, 
deliberations. 
(123) The Meeting therefore agreed to leave the item out of the Agenda 
of the XIXth ATCM and put it again on the Agenda of the XXth ATCM 
in order to give all Parties sufficient time to elaborate ways and means 
how to approach the question again in order to find an agreeable 
solution.” 
The invocation of a supposedly deliberate openness in Article IX(1) of the 
Antarctic Treaty is curious, since a reading of that article (above) suggests that 
this issue was specifically recognized as something that would be discussed at 
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a future meeting.  However, consistent with paragraph 123 of the Final Report 
of XVIII ATCM, the issue was next put on the agenda of the XX ATCM in 
1996. With no substantive discussion on the floor, this ATCM essentially 
closed down the discussion. The Final Report included two short paragraphs, 
the first reiterating the sentiments of paragraph 123 of 1994, and the second 
reading: 
“(74) The Meeting agreed that the Delegations had not yet had 
sufficient time to duly consider the issue, and decided to omit the item 
from the Agenda of the following Consultative Meetings until a 
request was made by a Consultative Party to reinclude it.”72 
So, a paper raising issues around jurisdiction (seemingly recognized at the 
adoption of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 as an issue that needed attention), 
triggered by a serious incident in the Antarctic, was kicked around for four 
years after its introduction, before being punted out of the ground. Fourteen 
years on from this, no Consultative Party seems to have requested the re-
inclusion of this agenda item, and no discussion of jurisdiction along these 
lines has occurred, despite the fact that incidents of the sort that exercised 
Uruguay have been the nightmare of many officials considering worst-case 
scenarios in an increasingly multinational Antarctic. King George Island is not 
the only location in Antarctica where several national programme stations 
may now be found in close proximity, and/or multiple nationalities are 
present at a station. Although different to the 1992 incident, potentially 
complex juridical situations around death or injury have also arisen in several 
other instances. The problem of jurisdiction remains to be resolved.  
 
The Antarctic Problem today 
 
The contemporary Antarctic problem combines both the traditional inter-state 
contestation of Antarctic territorial sovereignty evident in the 1950s and the 
new technology-enabled frictions of actual and reasonably foreseeable 
commercial activities. Whereas, the pre-Antarctic Treaty problem was that 
territorial sovereignty issues (given further edge by their situation alongside 
the global ideological bipolarity of the Cold War) occurred outside any 
institutional framework, the present problem occurs despite the operational 
continuation of that framework, the ATS. Indeed, in some respects the 
sheltering of territorial sovereignty within the Antarctic Treaty may even 
have exacerbated the problem.73 Without regular and active contestation, the 
costs to a claimant of maintaining a contested position have been quite slight. 
Why then would it feel under any pressure to revisit its position, particularly 
over the decades when operational limitations, lack of knowledge or a 
potential market for a particular resource, meant it was not actively seeking to 
realize supposed rights? Now, not only is the possibility of 
resource/commercial activity which was all but impossible in the 1950s a 
reality, but formal sanctions for these activities are present (or asserted to be) 
in both ATS and non-ATS global regimes. Further, with the dominant 
planetary ideology now globalism and neoliberalism, it has proven 
increasingly difficult to agree any substantive Antarctic-specific governance 
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system for local manifestations of emergent global industries such as tourism 
or bioprospecting. 
Now that Antarctica is seen to possess actually realizable commercial 
benefits (fishing, tourism, bioprospecting, and, notwithstanding the current 
minerals resource activity prohibition,74 the ongoing interest in hydrocarbons 
and, perhaps further out, other mineral resources), it is even harder for 
claimants to let go of their supposed territorial rights than it was in the past. 
This is particularly so if global regimes promise to grant valuable rights to 
them precisely because they are territorial/coastal states (the UNCLOS Article 
76 dilemma). Absent the Cold-War glue and the general technical restraints of 
a difficult Antarctic environment, in an international milieu of unrestrained 
commercial competition, the Antarctic regime is extremely vulnerable. It 
cannot grow; it cannot easily update even those capacities that it has; it faces 
competition from global regimes (or global norms of market liberalization 
outside traditional institutional regulation) for jurisdiction over particular 
fields; and its original problem (territorial sovereignty) is reinvigorated. 
This has transformed the ATS from a regional forum wherein 
substantive policy responses were not only initiated and adopted, but also 
operationally managed, to one which risks becoming merely a limited regional 
coordinating mechanism, with responses increasingly elaborated elsewhere. 
What we have seen is a disabling of the substantive core of the ATS, whilst 
leaving its edifice intact. It has not collapsed, but it has been hollowed out. 
This hollowing has some significance, not only in relation to a more objective 
analysis of its recent and contemporary successes and failures, but 
(particularly) in relation to the future governance of the Antarctic. It seems 
unlikely to provide a sustainable governance regime for Antarctica if these 
trends continue.  
Possible remedies are, of course, easier to suggest than to implement. 
Central, in my view, to any project to reinvigorate and in a sense “re-boot” the 
ATS, is a restoration of confidence in the propriety of an Antarctic 
exceptionalism. Clearly the historic exceptionalism has gone, at least in any 
substantive sense. ATCPs are still formally committed to special duties and 
rights by virtue of being ATCPs, and for claimants in particular there are still 
some particular benefits to this vestigial exceptionalism. But when it comes to 
addressing current and emergent issues, there is little evidence of vitality in 
this approach. Unless a basis for new exceptionalism is crafted, the new issues 
will either not be addressed at all, or they will be picked up through evolving 
global instruments or norms. If the latter, then inevitably the particularities of 
the Antarctic risk being lost, and thus even if global standards formally apply 
in Antarctica, they may in fact not really be appropriate there. Duncan French 
has, positively, responded to an earlier expression of concern about Antarctica 
being driven by global norms,75 by suggesting the need for the ATS to 
incorporate and operationalise global meta-principles. As he notes, these 
principles can connect to the ATCP’s legal commitments and political 
responsibilities as “global trustees of the Antarctic environment”.76 This seems 
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to me an immensely useful proposal, since it offers a means to not only 
reinvigorate the ATS but also to enhance the mandate of a regional 
dispensation with that large part of the international community of states 
(and, indeed, other actors) which is not itself able to participate in the 
Antarctic. It is however my sense that the present institutional architecture is 
not adequate to such a project. Difficult as it is likely to prove to get it up, the 
ATS now needs a periodic meeting of Ministers if it is to be able to consider 
substantive political projects of this sort, akin to the sort of annual meetings 
we see for so many other regional groupings. The largely polar-focused 
Antarctic bureaucracy that provides the personnel for the officials-operated 
ATCMs and CCAMLR Commission meetings, is not well equipped to 
integrate extra-Antarctic political considerations into the ATS. Indeed, it may 
be unable to really address the intra-ATS problems and the sometimes 
deliberate fractionation of seemingly common issues across different 
instruments. A putative “Council of Antarctic Ministers (COAM)” would not 
substitute for the existing ATCMs or CCAMLR Commission Meetings 
(indeed, it might be hoped to breath new life into these by creating clearer 
strategic direction for officials), nor need it meet with the same annual 
frequency. Perhaps a three-year interval between sessions would be 
appropriate, but these are merely details.  
The establishment of COAM plainly entails risks. These may include 
the practical one of it only attracting low-level representatives with no real 
mandate to negotiate anything on the part of their governments, so that one 
ends up with essentially just another bureaucratic session. If this problem can 
be avoided, a substantive further risk appears, namely that “political” 
interests will see principle and the traditional Antarctic values traded away 
because these people will always have the proverbial bigger fish to fry. In my 
experience this is the basis upon which most officials privately argue against 
such a proposition. This is not an entirely unrealistic fear. But it is, in a sense, 
a counsel of despair. So long as the implicit alternative (an active, progressive 
ATS mediated by officials) was actually doing something, it could be argued 
that this provided a safer and proven mechanism for Antarctic governance. 
Due to the current challenges the ATS faces, this may no longer be quite so 
compelling an argument. If, as I do, one sees problems in the present hiatus in 
ATS development and the limitations in the present operational management 
of burgeoning Antarctic activities, alternatives warrant serious examination. 
How else, apart from the political process, with all its flaws and risks, are we 
to mediate the increasingly complex array of interests and aspirations evident 
in Antarctica? A narrow, officials-mediated institution, which accepts advice 
from only a very few sources, and which is grounded in an ageing and no 
longer developing ATS, seems an uncertain platform for success. 
We need to find a new basis for confidence in a regional governance 
arrangement in the Antarctic, and that requires new thinking as well as a 
confidence that some historic Antarctic values are worth defending. If we can 
reinvigorate and expand the Antarctic Treaty System, so that it can continue 
to provide the institutional architecture to do this, fine. But if it cannot or will 
not evolve, there is nothing about the Antarctic situation that will prevent the 
real power to determine Antarctic futures going elsewhere.  
